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Preserving Your Right To Parent: The Supreme Court of North
Carolina Addresses Unmarried Fathers’ Due Process Rights in
In Re Adoption of S.D.W.*

INTRODUCTION
The prototypical nuclear family is on the decline.1 Between forty
and fifty percent of marriages end in divorce,2 and more than forty
percent of all births in the United States are to unmarried women.3
Yet, courts still regard marriage as “[t]he most effective protection of
[a] father’s opportunity to develop a relationship with his child.”4 It
was not until the early 1970s that the United States Supreme Court
officially recognized that unmarried fathers had parental rights
protected under the Constitution.5 Since the 1970s, family structures
have changed rapidly,6 and as a result, the Supreme Court has had to
refine its position on biological fathers’ rights. It is now settled law
that biological fathers have a due process right to notice of any
adoption proceeding and may withhold consent to the adoption under
certain circumstances.7
* © 2015 Erin E. Gibbs.
1. See Jennifer R. Johnson, Preferred By Law: The Disappearance of the Traditional
Family and Law’s Refusal To Let It Go, 25 WOMEN’S RTS. L. REP. 125, 128–29 (2004).
2. Marriage & Divorce, AM. PSYCHOL. ASS’N (2014), http://www.apa.org/topics
/divorce/ [http://perma.cc/W3ZU-JTCE].
3. Unmarried Childbearing, CDC, http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/fastats/unmarriedchildbearing.htm (last updated Sept. 30, 2015) [http://perma.cc/C7K4-9PK9].
4. Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248, 263 (1983).
5. See Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 649 (1972) (holding that an unmarried father
was denied due process of law under the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment when the state took his children from his custody after the death of their
mother because of a statutory scheme that excluded unmarried fathers from the definition
of “parent”).
6. See generally TOM W. SMITH, NAT’L OP. RESEARCH CTR., UNIV. CHI., CHANGES
IN FAMILY STRUCTURE, FAMILY VALUES, AND POLITICS, 1972–2006 (2008), http://
publicdata.norc.org:41000/gss/documents/scrt/sc53%20changes%20in%20family%20structur
e,%20family%20values,%20and%20politics,%201972-2006.pdf [http://perma.cc/3QHK-7GW8]
(describing how “[f]amily structure and family values have undergone tremendous
changes over the last generation”).
7. See, e.g., Lehr, 463 U.S. at 267–68 (holding that a putative father was not entitled
to notice under the Due Process Clause or Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment); Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380, 401 (1979) (holding that a New York
law that allowed natural mothers but not fathers to block an adoption by withholding
consent violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment); Stanley, 405
U.S. at 645 (holding that an unmarried father was denied due process of law under the
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What happens when an unmarried biological father is unaware
that he has become a father until after the adoption is already in
progress, however, is anything but clear. Should the father’s consent
be required before the adoption can be finalized? Does not knowing
about the child excuse a putative father’s noninvolvement, or should
he bear the responsibility for keeping track of any children he may
have fathered? Complicating the matter even further is the fact that
some women will either actively thwart a father’s attempts to develop
a relationship with his child or outright lie about the child’s existence
and the father’s identity.8
Many states have not yet adequately addressed these realities,
either through legislation or through the courts,9 and North Carolina
is no exception. In June 2014, the Supreme Court of North Carolina
was forced to confront these issues in In re Adoption of S.D.W.
(“S.D.W.”).10 In S.D.W., after hiding her pregnancy from her former
paramour, a woman placed her child for adoption and actively
misrepresented the father’s identity both on an affidavit of parentage
and to the adoption agency.11 When the father later found out about
the child, he attempted to intervene in the adoption proceeding, but a
trial court ruled that his consent was not required to proceed under
North Carolina law.12 A long and expensive13 legal battle ensued, and
Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment when the state took his children
from his custody after the death of their mother because of a statutory scheme that
excluded unmarried fathers from the definition of “parent”). But see Quilloin v. Walcott,
434 U.S. 246, 256 (1978) (holding that the consent of an unmarried father who had never
sought actual or legal custody of his child was not required for adoption).
8. See, e.g., In re Adoption of A.A.T., 196 P.3d 1180, 1205 (Kan. 2008) (Nuss, J.,
dissenting) (discussing a biological father’s consent to adoption where the biological
mother lied about having had an abortion); In re Baby Boy K, 546 N.W.2d 86, 88 (S.D.
1996) (discussing an affidavit where a biological mother admitted to lying about the
identity of the child’s biological father); Robert O. v. Russell K., 604 N.E.2d 99, 100–01
(N.Y. 1992) (discussing a biological mother who did not inform the biological father of the
pregnancy or birth until ten months after the adoption was finalized).
9. See, e.g., Laura Oren, Thwarted Fathers or Pop-Up Pops?: How To Determine
When Putative Fathers Can Block the Adoption of Their Newborn Children, 40 FAM. L.Q.
153, 175 (2006) (“Although in the last ten years many state legislatures have devised
evermore explicit schemes to clearly and timely sort the ‘thwarted father’ with the right to
withhold consent from the ‘pop-up pop’ who has forfeited his opportunity interest in a
relationship with his child, much uncertainty remains.”).
10. 367 N.C. 386, 758 S.E.2d 374 (2014).
11. Id. at 388, 758 S.E.2d at 376.
12. Id. at 390–91, 758 S.E.2d at 377–78.
13. The father, Gregory Johns, claimed to have spent over $100,000 on legal fees, well
before his case even made it before the Supreme Court of North Carolina. See Alyssa
Rosenberg, Dad Spends Father’s Day Alone, with Hopes To Meet His Son, WWAY (June 16,
2013), http://www.wwaytv3.com/2013/06/16/dad-spends-fathers-day-alone-hopes-to-meet-hisson [http://perma.cc/QX97-2TU5].
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eventually, the Supreme Court of North Carolina upheld the trial
court’s determination that the father’s constitutional rights were not
violated.14 While the facts in this case are unique and, to some extent,
sensational, the court’s decision could nonetheless have broad
implications for future adoptions throughout North Carolina.
This Recent Development contends that S.D.W. was wrongly
decided, but not just for the reasons the dissent identifies. Part I
begins by laying out the constitutional and statutory frameworks for
biological fathers’ rights in adoptions in North Carolina. Part II then
examines S.D.W. in detail, ultimately concluding that it was wrongly
decided. Part III addresses both the majority’s and the dissent’s
concerns, as well as certain implications of the court’s decision that
both opinions fail to contemplate. Finally, Part IV recommends a new
statutory scheme that would more effectively handle adoption
placements—in cases both similar to and dissimilar to S.D.W.—in the
future.
I. CONTEXTUALIZING THE DEBATE—THE CONSTITUTIONAL AND
STATUTORY FRAMEWORK FOR BIOLOGICAL FATHERS AND
ADOPTION IN NORTH CAROLINA
A. The Constitutional Framework
Although nearly half of all births in the United States are now to
unmarried women,15 less than fifty years ago, the legal rights and
obligations of fathers and children were almost exclusively tied to
marriage.16 In the early twentieth century, marriage was the prevailing
way for parents to take responsibility for their children.17 In fact, at
common law, nonmarital children were considered filius nullius—the
children of no one.18 Nonmarital children did not have the same
inheritance rights as marital children, and wrongful death claims and
14. See In re Adoption of S.D.W., 367 N.C. at 396, 758 S.E.2d at 381.
15. See CDC, supra note 3.
16. See Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248, 263 (1983) (“The most effective protection of
the putative father’s opportunity to develop a relationship with his child is provided by the
laws that authorize formal marriage and govern its consequences.”).
17. See David T. Ellwood & Christopher Jencks, The Spread of Single-Parent Families in
the United States Since 1960, at 6 (John F. Kennedy Sch. of Gov’t, Harvard Univ., Working
Paper No. RWP04-008, 2004), https://research.hks.harvard.edu/publications/workingpapers
/citation.aspx?PubId=2069&type=WPN [http://perma.cc/G4H8-KXXD] (“In 1960 most
men and women who engaged in premarital sex assumed that if the woman became
pregnant they would marry and raise the child together. As a result, premarital
pregnancies were fairly common, but premarital births were rare.”).
18. Solangel Maldonado, Illegitimate Harm: Law, Stigma, and Discrimination Against
Nonmarital Children, 63 FLA. L. REV. 345, 350 (2011).
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government benefits relating to the death of a parent were available
only to marital children.19 It was not until 1968 that the United States
Supreme Court explicitly recognized the rights of nonmarital children
under the Equal Protection Clause,20 prompting a series of opinions
throughout the 1970s that eliminated distinctions between marital and
nonmarital children.21
Similarly, unmarried fathers had limited rights in regard to child
rearing until the 1970s. Before 1972, in a vast majority of states, an
unwed mother had the sole authority to place a child for adoption
with no input from the child’s father required.22 However, in 1972, the
Supreme Court extended constitutional protections to unmarried
biological fathers for the first time,23 affirming that “[t]he right[] to
conceive and to raise one’s children”24 is a “basic civil right[].”25 Over
the next several years, coinciding with the rapid rise in availability of
technology that could easily and accurately identify a biological link
between father and child,26 the Supreme Court completely
transformed the way courts view the constitutional rights of biological
fathers.27 This development was grounded in the Due Process and
Equal Protection clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment.28
This transformation started in 1972 with Stanley v. Illinois.29 In
Stanley, the Court held that an unmarried father who was raising his
children had a due process right to a hearing on parental fitness
before the state could take the children from his custody.30 The Court
stopped short, however, of extending those rights to biological fathers

19. See id. at 350–51.
20. See Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68, 70 (1968) (“We start from the premise that
illegitimate children are not ‘nonpersons.’ They are humans, live, and have their being.
They are clearly ‘persons’ within the meaning of the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment.” (internal footnotes omitted)).
21. See, e.g., Jimenez v. Weinberger, 417 U.S. 628, 636 (1974) (invalidating a blanket
ban on nonmarital children receiving social security disability benefits); N.J. Welfare
Rights Org. v. Cahill, 411 U.S. 619, 621 (1973) (striking down a statute denying welfare
benefits to nonmarital children); Weber v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 406 U.S. 164, 175–76
(1972) (overturning a law denying worker’s compensation benefits to unacknowledged
nonmarital children).
22. See Robert Rausch, Unwed Fathers and the Adoption Process, 22 WM. & MARY L.
REV. 85, 85 (1980).
23. See Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 658 (1972).
24. Id. at 651.
25. Id. (quoting Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942)).
26. See Oren, supra note 9, at 154.
27. See id. at 154–55.
28. See supra note 7.
29. 405 U.S. 645 (1972).
30. See id. at 658.
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who had not played a part in raising their children.31 Later, in 1978,
the Court clarified in Quilloin v. Walcott32 that fathers do not have a
due process right to consent to or veto an adoption when they have
failed to take actual or legal custody of the child.33 In that case, the
Court allowed a stepfather to adopt a child over the biological
father’s objections because it was in the child’s best interest.34 Even
though the father in Quilloin did have a relationship with his child—
visiting with the child and giving gifts on occasion35—he had “never
shouldered any significant responsibility with respect to the daily
supervision, education, protection, or care of the child.”36
The following year, the Supreme Court went even further,
declaring that a New York statute giving the right to consent to an
adoption to unwed mothers but not to unwed fathers, regardless of
their actual involvement with the child, violated the Constitution.37 In
Caban v. Mohammed38 the Court held that, because the children had
previously lived with their father and because he had maintained
regular contact with them,39 he was similarly situated to the children’s
mother.40 The statute allowing an adoption to proceed without his
consent was thus overturned as a violation of the Equal Protection
Clause.41
Finally, in Lehr v. Robertson,42 the Court clarified that biological
fathers do have an incipient interest in raising their children, noting
that “[biology] offers the natural father an opportunity that no other
male possesses to develop a relationship with his offspring.”43 The
Court then went on to say that a father who “grasps that opportunity
and accepts some measure of responsibility for the child’s
future . . . may enjoy the blessings of the parent-child relationship[,]”44
but that when “he fails to do so, the Federal Constitution will not

31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.

See id.
434 U.S. 246 (1978).
Id. at 255.
See id.
See id. at 251.
Id. at 256.
See Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380, 394 (1979).
441 U.S. 380 (1979).
See id. at 382–83.
See id. at 399 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
See id. at 394 (majority opinion).
463 U.S. 248 (1983).
Id. at 262.
Id.
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automatically compel a State to listen to his opinion of where the
child’s best interests lie.”45
Lehr established that a putative father’s due process rights are
layered. First, he has an “inchoate” interest in developing a
relationship with his child,46 but by itself, “the mere existence of a
biological link does not merit . . . constitutional protection.”47 Instead,
the biological father’s inchoate interest must be accompanied by an
active parenting effort and/or financial support because “[t]he
importance of the familial relationship . . . stems from the emotional
attachments that derive from the intimacy of daily association.”48 So
while a putative father’s inchoate interest must be protected, that
interest may be forfeited if he fails to avail himself of the opportunity
biology has afforded him.49 Procedurally, this amounts to an
entitlement to notice and the right to withhold consent to an adoption
proceeding, but again, that right is not absolute.50 The right hinges not
only on biology, but also on the father having taken responsibility for
and actively participated in a child’s life.51 Still, the dividing line
between an active and involved father who has earned constitutional
protection of his rights and an uninvolved father who has forfeited his
rights remains unclear.
North Carolina courts have followed the Supreme Court’s
application of Lehr.52 Not only is the state bound by the Federal
Constitution, but the North Carolina Constitution’s law of the land
clause53 has been interpreted as the state’s equivalent of the Due
Process Clause.54 State courts’ interpretation of biological fathers’
rights within the North Carolina Constitution has been largely
indistinguishable from federal courts’ interpretations of the analogous
clauses under the United States Constitution.55 Still, what constitutes
45. Id.
46. Id. at 248.
47. Id. at 261.
48. Id. (quoting Smith v. Org. of Foster Families for Equal. & Reform, 431 U.S. 816,
844 (1977)).
49. See id. at 250–51.
50. See id.
51. See id. at 250–51, 262.
52. See, e.g., In re Baby Boy Dixon, 112 N.C. App. 248, 251, 435 S.E.2d 352, 354
(1993) (asserting that constitutional rights to due process do not “spring full-blown from
the biological connection” (quoting Lehr, 463 U.S. at 262)).
53. N.C. CONST. art. I, § 19.
54. City of Asheville v. State, 192 N.C. App. 1, 44, 665 S.E.2d 103, 133 (2008).
55. See, e.g., In re Adoption of S.D.W., 367 N.C. 386, 392, 758 S.E.2d 374, 378 (2014)
(“Because Johns has not argued that the Law of the Land Clause of the Constitution of
North Carolina and the Due Process Clause of the Constitution of the United States are to
be interpreted differently here, we will not distinguish between them in our analysis.”).
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active participation in a child’s life—in particular a very young child’s
life—is hard to define, and the responsibility of unwitting fathers
proves even harder to define.
B.

The Statutory Framework

The federal and state constitutions provide only a loose
framework for biological fathers’ rights. States are left to fill in the
blanks for themselves when it comes to providing a workable
statutory scheme for adoptions that, among other things, protects the
due process rights of unmarried fathers.56 The statutes should not
exclude too many responsible fathers from their protection,57 but
beyond that, the only requirement for a statutory scheme to meet
bare-minimum procedural requirements under the Constitution after
Lehr is that whatever criteria an interested putative father must meet
in order to qualify for an entitlement to notice must not be “beyond
[his] control.”58
With regard to notice and consent in adoption proceedings,
North Carolina’s statute gives a virtual veto power over an adoption
to several categories of people.59 Those whose consent is required
before an adoption can proceed include the birth mother;60 the birth
mother’s husband61 or very recent ex-husband;62 any man who has
attempted to marry the mother before the child’s birth;63 and any man
who has otherwise legitimated the child, taken on an obligation of
support for the child, or accepted the child into his home and held
himself out as the child’s father before the filing of the adoption
petition.64 Notably, the statutes do not require that a man in the
above-mentioned categories also be the biological father of the child
in question.65 Additionally, even when a putative father is entitled to
notice because of his inclusion in one of these categories and is
required to give consent to the adoption proceeding, if he fails to

56. See United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2680 (2013) (“Subject to certain
constitutional guarantees, ‘regulation of domestic relations’ is ‘an area that has long been
regarded as a virtually exclusive province of the States.’ ” (quoting Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U.S.
393, 404 (1975) (internal citation omitted)).
57. See Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248, 264 (1983).
58. Id.
59. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 48-3-601 (2013).
60. § 48-3-601(2)(a).
61. § 48-3-601(2)(b)(1).
62. Id.
63. § 48-3-601(2)(b)(2).
64. § 48-3-601(2)(b)(3)–(5).
65. § 48-3-601(2)(b).
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respond to the notice in a timely manner, his consent will no longer
be required.66
There are glaring omissions in North Carolina’s statutes. The
statutory framework does not address fathers who are actively
thwarted from establishing relationships with their children, nor does
it protect fathers who may be interested but are unaware that they
have fathered children. Moreover, the statutes do not seem to
recognize the possibility of a mother having purposefully lied or
misrepresented the identity of the child’s father. Though the statutes
do not confront these scenarios, they are unfortunate realities—
realities that the court faced in S.D.W. and will likely have to face
again in the future.
II. UNDERSTANDING IN RE ADOPTION OF S.D.W.
A. Factual Background and Procedural History
The factual record in S.D.W. describes an unfortunate situation
and a close call. In S.D.W., Laura Welker and Gregory Johns became
parents as a result of their “mostly physical”67 relationship, which
lasted from May 2009 until February or March 2010.68 During that
time period, the two had sex between ten and twenty times a week.69
Johns was aware that Welker was fertile—she already had a child who
was living with her mother.70 During the summer of 2009, Welker
once again became pregnant and notified Johns.71 They mutually
decided that Welker would have an abortion.72 After the pregnancy
was terminated, Johns testified that Welker informed him she was
using another form of birth control that he identified as either a
patch—though he had never seen a patch on her body despite having
sex with her more than ten times a week—or an “IUD band.”73
Though Johns was inadequately informed about the birth control
methods they were using, he and Welker continued to have sex
regularly and without condoms for the next several months.74

66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.

Id. § 48-3-603(a)(7)–(8).
In re Adoption of S.D.W., 367 N.C. 386, 387, 758 S.E.2d 374, 375 (2014).
Id.
Id.
Id., 758 S.E.2d at 375–76.
Id., 758 S.E.2d at 376.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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Welker eventually cut contact with Johns in March of 2010,75 at
which point she was, unbeknownst to Johns, already pregnant with his
baby. Welker gave birth on October 10, 2010, and the next day, filed
an affidavit of parentage, misnaming the father as “Gregory Thomas
James” instead of “Gregory Joseph Johns” and listing no last known
address.76 She then relinquished custody of the newborn to an
adoption agency called Christian Adoption Services.77 The adoption
agency placed the child with his prospective adoptive parents,
Benjamin and Heather Jones, on October 12, 2010, a mere two days
after his birth.78 Two weeks later, on October 27, Welker signed a
form for the adoption agency once again misidentifying Gregory
Johns as “Gregory Thomas James.”79
On November 2, 2010, the Joneses filed a petition to legally
adopt the child, while the agency, relying on the false name Welker
had given, set out to find and notify Johns.80 When the agency
predictably failed to find Johns, the adoption proceeding was stayed,81
and the agency filed a motion to terminate the father’s parental rights
on November 16, 2010.82 Meanwhile, on November 26, 2010, a mere
six weeks after giving birth, Welker visited Johns on his birthday and
engaged in sexual intercourse.83 Even then, she still declined to
inform him of the child he had fathered.84 Nonetheless, by late April
of 2011, Johns finally learned that Welker had given birth.85 After
hearing the news from an acquaintance, Johns confronted Welker on
April 25, 2011, and she eventually admitted that she had indeed given
birth to a son, Johns’s biological child, and had placed him for
adoption.86
Johns expressed his intent to obtain custody of the baby, leading
Welker to confess Johns’s true identity to the adoption agency.87
Subsequently, counsel for the adoption agency voluntarily dismissed
its action to terminate parental rights on May 2, 2011. As a result, the
court removed the temporary stay on the adoption proceeding, and
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.

Id.
Id. at 399, 758 S.E.2d at 383 (Jackson, J., dissenting)
Id. at 388, 758 S.E.2d at 376 (majority opinion).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
In re S.D.W., __ N.C. App. __, __, 745 S.E.2d 38, 40–41 (2013).
In re Adoption of S.D.W., 367 N.C. at 387, 758 S.E.2d at 376.
See id.
Id. at 388, 758 S.E.2d at 376.
Id. at 399, 758 S.E.2d at 383 (Jackson, J., dissenting).
Id. at 388, 758 S.E.2d at 376 (majority opinion).
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three days later, the Joneses gave notice of their intention to proceed
with the adoption.88 Johns retained counsel and, after several months
of back and forth, on January 6, 2012, a district court judge held that
North Carolina’s adoption statutes did not require Johns’s consent to
the adoption and denied all his motions, thereby allowing the
adoption to move forward.89
The case then moved to the North Carolina Court of Appeals,
which held that the district court judge correctly interpreted North
Carolina’s statutes as not requiring Johns’s consent.90 The court held
that, even though Johns did not know of his child’s existence until
after the adoption petition was filed, his consent was not required by
statute because he had not sought to establish a relationship with the
child prior to its filing.91 However, the court held that:
[A] biological father who, prior to the filing of the petition was
unaware that the mother was pregnant and had no reason to
know, promptly takes steps to assume parental responsibility
upon discovering the existence of the child, has developed a
constitutionally protected interest sufficient to require his
consent where the adoption proceeding is still pending.92
The court explained that, even though his consent was not required
by statute, if the facts were as Johns described them, his constitutional
due process rights were violated when the adoption was allowed to
proceed despite his objections.93 The court then remanded the case
for further factual determinations.94
B.

The Supreme Court of North Carolina’s Analysis

When the case made its way to the Supreme Court of North
Carolina, the court clarified the applicable legal standard as that
established by the United States Supreme Court in Lehr.95 Johns
conceded that he did not fit the statute’s definition of a responsible

88. Id.
89. Id. at 388–90, 758 S.E.2d at 376–77.
90. In re S.D.W., __ N.C. App. __, __, 745 S.E.2d 38, 43 (2013).
91. Id. at __, 745 S.E.2d at 50 (citing N.C. GEN. STAT. § 48-3-601(2)(b) (2013)).
92. In re S.D.W., __ N.C. App. at __, 745 S.E.2d at 51 (emphasis added).
93. See id. at __, 745 S.E.2d at 44.
94. See id.
95. See In re Adoption of S.D.W., 367 N.C. 386, 391–92, 758 S.E.2d 374, 378 (2014);
see also Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248, 263–64 (1983) (noting that statutes that “omit
many responsible fathers” and have qualifications for notice that are “beyond the control
of an interested putative father” are procedurally inadequate).
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parent entitled to notice,96 and he did not challenge the statute’s
validity.97 Accordingly, the only plausible basis for his due process
claim was the possibility that the statutory qualifications for notice
were “beyond his control.”98 The court then set about applying this
exceptionally vague standard to the facts at hand.99 Unsurprisingly,
the seven justices did not agree.100
Justice Edmunds, writing for the majority, acknowledged
Welker’s behavior as “troubling,”101 but condemned Johns’s behavior
as well.102 Welker not only provided a false name, thereby
“obstructing official efforts to locate the father,”103 she also visited
Johns less than two months after giving birth and kept the news of
their child to herself.104 Still, Justice Edmunds insisted that while
Welker’s behavior was less than admirable, nothing she did put Johns
in the position where meeting the qualifications for notice under the
statute were no longer within his control.105 Instead, the majority
blamed the fact that Johns did not qualify for notice on his
“incuriosity and disinterest.”106
The majority focused heavily on Johns’s irresponsibility with
regard to birth control. Though the court stopped short of
implementing a rule saying that the act of having sex is enough to put
a man on notice that he has fathered a child,107 the majority still
faulted Johns for not finding out about his child sooner. Johns knew
that Welker was fertile because he was aware that she had had a child
before they met,108 and he had already impregnated her once.109 But
even after the abortion, Johns took on no additional responsibility for
birth control.110 Johns assumed Welker’s birth control would be
96. In re Adoption of S.D.W., 367 N.C. at 394–95, 758 S.E.2d at 380; see also supra
notes 59–66 and accompanying text for a list of the categories of people entitled to notice
and an opportunity to consent before an adoption proceeding begins.
97. See In re Adoption of S.D.W., 367 N.C. at 394, 758 S.E.2d at 380; see also N.C.
GEN. STAT. § 48-3-601(2)(b) (2013).
98. See In re Adoption of S.D.W., 367 N.C. at 395, 758 S.E.2d at 379 (citing Lehr v.
Robertson, 463 U.S. 248, 263–64 (1983)).
99. See id.
100. See id. at 396, 758 S.E.2d at 381.
101. Id. at 395, 758 S.E.2d at 380.
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. Id. at 396, 758 S.E.2d at 381.
106. Id. at 395, 758 S.E.2d at 380.
107. See id.
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. See id. at 395, 758 S.E.2d at 380–81.
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effective, despite the fact that her birth control had already failed
once during their relationship,111 and he did not use condoms, even
after the abortion.112
Moreover, when Johns finally did confront Welker in April of
2011, she eventually admitted to having given birth to his child.113 The
majority interpreted this as evidence that the burden on Johns to find
out that Welker had been pregnant was low—all he had to do was
ask.114 Meanwhile, while Johns was oblivious to his son’s existence,
S.D.W. had already been living with and bonding with his prospective
adoptive parents, the Joneses.115 To the majority, Johns’s passivity
amounted to his having had the opportunity to establish himself as a
responsible father but failing to grasp it.116 Accordingly, the court held
that he did not have a liberty interest in developing a relationship
with his child, and therefore allowing an adoption to move forward
without his consent was not a violation of his due process rights.117
Three justices, however, saw it differently. Writing for the
dissent, Justice Jackson chastised the majority for failing to give
sufficient deference to a biological father’s “inchoate” interest,
described in Lehr.118 Instead of narrowly focusing on whether
opportunity for notice was “beyond [his] control,”119 the dissent
focused on whether Johns was afforded sufficient opportunities to
protect his inchoate interest in developing a relationship with his child
and concluded that he was not.120 Though the dissent agreed with the
majority’s retelling of the facts of the case, in Justice Jackson’s
reasoning, several of the facts the majority cited actually undermined
its ultimate conclusion.121 The dissent identified and rebutted four of
the reasons the majority gave for ruling against Johns.122
First, with regard to the use of birth control in S.D.W. and its
implications, the dissent posited that the majority’s position on birth
control essentially requires couples to use “multiple, redundant forms
of contraception or risk losing any rights [the putative father] might
111. See id. at 387, 758 S.E.2d at 376.
112. Id. (describing Johns’s testimony about Welker’s birth control methods).
113. Id. at 399, 758 S.E.2d at 383 (Jackson, J., dissenting).
114. See id. at 395, 758 S.E.2d at 381 (majority opinion).
115. Id.
116. See id. at 396, 758 S.E.2d at 381.
117. Id.
118. Id. at 397, 758 S.E.2d at 381(Jackson, J., dissenting).
119. Id. at 394, 758 S.E.2d at 380 (majority opinion) (citing Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S.
248, 263–64 (1983)).
120. See id. at 398, 758 S.E.2d at 382 (Jackson, J., dissenting).
121. See id.
122. See id.
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have to raise and care for any children that result from this
(protected) sexual activity.”123 Because Welker told Johns that she
was on birth control, the dissent argued, the majority opinion
effectively requires men to wear condoms in addition to any other
forms of birth control the couple might be using.
Second, the majority took the fact that Johns had already
impregnated Welker once before and that he was involved in her
decision to have an abortion as evidence that he knew that she was
fertile.124 The dissent, however, interpreted this to mean that Johns
had no reason to believe that Welker would hide any future
pregnancies from him.125 Given that history, the dissent saw no reason
that Johns should have had “to remain in contact with Welker and
affirmatively inquire whether she was pregnant with his child, even
after their romantic relationship ended.”126
Third, instead of focusing on Johns’s responsibility to inquire
about Welker’s pregnancy, the dissent emphasized the relative ease
with which Welker could have notified Johns.127 His contact
information had not changed at all during the pregnancy or after the
birth of the child. In fact, Johns lived in the same apartment he had
lived in for several years, the same place where Welker had visited
him more than a hundred times.128 He also kept both the same home
and cell phone numbers.129
Finally, even though Welker could have easily contacted Johns,
she chose to deceive him—and others—instead.130 Welker told the
adoption agency that she did not know the address or phone number
of the father and that she had no way to contact him,131 even though
Johns had neither moved nor changed his number.132 Welker also
misidentified Johns on the affidavit of parentage and the adoption
agency forms133 and failed to list him on the child’s birth certificate.134
Additionally, Welker chose not to tell Johns about the pregnancy or
the birth, even though they slept together just a few weeks after

123.
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.
131.
132.
133.
134.

Id.
See id. at 395, 758 S.E.2d at 380 (majority opinion).
See id. at 398, 758 S.E.2d at 382 (Jackson, J., dissenting).
Id.
See id. at 398–99, 758 S.E.2d at 382.
See id.
Id.
See id. at 399, 758 S.E.2d at 383.
See In re S.D.W., __ N.C. App. __, __, 745 S.E.2d 38, 40 (2013).
See In re Adoption of S.D.W., 367 N.C. at 398–99, 758 S.E.2d at 382.
See id. at 399, 758 S.E.2d at 383.
See id.
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Welker gave birth.135 And when Johns eventually did confront her
directly, she initially denied that the baby was his before ultimately
relenting and admitting that he was, in fact, the father.136 In the
dissent’s eyes, these four factors, taken together, amounted to no
meaningful opportunity for Johns to develop his relationship with his
child and acquire an entitlement to notice to the adoption under the
statutes. Therefore, he did not relinquish his constitutional right to
develop a relationship with his child, and the adoption should not
have proceeded without his consent.
III. WHERE THE COURT WENT WRONG
While both the majority and dissent raise valid points, this
Recent Development takes the position that the dissent was correct:
Johns’s missed opportunity to develop a relationship with his son was
beyond his control.137 That he did not know of his son’s existence until
the child had already been placed with his adoptive family138 meant
that Johns had no meaningful opportunity to develop a relationship
with his son. Rather, Johns could not step up as a father because
Welker did not inform him of his son’s existence. Once he learned of
his son, he acted swiftly to assert his rights.139 The majority and
dissent both discuss the potential implications of this decision on the
use of birth control in future cases, but it would have been more
useful to analyze which party was responsible for Johns’s ignorance of
his child’s existence. Moreover, both the majority and dissent
overlooked another potential implication of this decision—that it
fosters suspicion and distrust between current and former romantic
partners.
A. The Court’s Misplaced Focus on Birth Control
Both the majority and dissenting opinions discuss birth control in
some detail, but that focus, in this case, is misguided. What kind of
birth control the parties did or did not use should not be the deciding
factor in this case, and furthermore, the court’s focus on
contraception necessitates confronting its potential implications in

135. See id. at 387, 758 S.E.2d at 376.
136. Id. at 399, 758 S.E.2d at 383 (Jackson, J., dissenting).
137. See id. at 396, 758 S.E.2d at 381.
138. See id. at 387, 758 S.E.2d at 376 (majority opinion).
139. Johns attempted to intervene in the adoption proceeding less than a month after
finding out about the child. See id. at 388, 758 S.E.2d at 376. He also prepared a nursery in
his home, In re S.D.W., __ N.C. App. __, __, 745 S.E.2d 38, 50 (2013), and expended
considerable resources pursuing this case. See supra note 13.
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future cases. The majority was compelled to clarify that its holding
does not mean that the act of sex itself effectively puts a man on
notice as to possibly having fathered a child140—one possible reading
of this decision. The dissent also worried that the majority’s decision
essentially requires men to use multiple forms of redundant birth
control lest they be considered on notice of a potential pregnancy.141
The dissent’s characterization of using multiple forms of birth
control as redundant may be true in some cases, but it is not accurate
in this case. Welker and Johns had two unplanned pregnancies in less
than a year,142 so using additional birth control would not necessarily
have been superfluous. Still, the court’s emphasis on birth control is
unseemly in this case. Decisions relating to family, children, and
contraception are both personal and private and should be free from
governmental intrusion as much as possible.143 Even the most
foolproof birth control methods fail on occasion.144 Moreover,
romantic partners need to be able to trust one another since most
forms of birth control are in the woman’s exclusive control and it
would be unreasonable to require men to constantly supervise their
partner’s use of contraception.
In other cases with different facts, such as cases where
reproductive coercion is alleged, it may be necessary to look into the
birth control methods a couple used. In this case, however, the
emphasis on birth control is unnecessary. Both parties were cavalier
about contraception, but only Welker actively concealed the
pregnancy and misidentified the child’s father.145 Determining
whether Johns’s ignorance of his son’s existence was or was not within
his control should not amount to speculating as to hypothetical
scenarios where, had Johns done everything differently, he might
have known about the pregnancy. Instead, the court should try to
determine who held the control in such a situation and, consequently,
who was responsible for Johns’s ignorance.
That is not to say that Johns was a completely blameless party
here. To an extent, the majority is correct when it accuses Johns of

140. See In re Adoption of S.D.W., 367 N.C. at 395, 758 S.E.2d at 380.
141. See id. at 398, 758 S.E.2d at 382 (Jackson, J., dissenting).
142. See id. at 387, 758 S.E.2d at 375–76 (majority opinion).
143. See Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 851 (1992).
144. See Effectiveness of Family Planning Methods, CDC, http://www.cdc.gov
/reproductivehealth/UnintendedPregnancy/PDF/Contraceptive_methods_508.pdf
[http://perma.cc/E7YF-KEQ2].
145. See In re Adoption of S.D.W., 367 N.C. at 398, 758 S.E.2d at 383 (Jackson, J.,
dissenting).
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“incuriosity.”146 In a perfect world, couples would all take shared
responsibility for contraception and be able to talk openly and
honestly about what to do in the event of an unplanned pregnancy.
Johns, though, was content to let Welker take responsibility for birth
control and not insist on the use of condoms.147 However, Johns is
hardly the first person to have taken a fast and loose approach to
contraception, and Welker is just as responsible as Johns in that
respect.
B.

The Court’s Failure To Consider the Parties’ Unequal Control

In lieu of its in-depth examination of the parties’ use of birth
control, the court should have devoted more attention to the question
of who in this situation had the most control over the outcome. In this
case, Johns was ignorant not because of his passivity, but because
Welker actively worked against him, thus depriving him of any
control over his relationship with his child. She knew that he was the
father of her child.148 She knew where he lived and how to contact
him.149 Based on their history, having already gone through an
unplanned pregnancy, Johns had no reason to believe that Welker
would not tell him about any other pregnancies.150 She held the
knowledge and power in this situation, and not only did she fail to
inform him of the pregnancy, but she actively worked against his
constitutional interest in developing a relationship with his child.151
Johns was at Welker’s mercy as to whether she would share this lifealtering information with him. Though Welker likely had the child’s
best interest at heart, she was not entitled to unilaterally decide to
place him for adoption when the father was neither unfit nor
disinterested.
Moreover, the tryst between Johns and Welker in November of
2010152 proves that he was not as disinterested as the majority portrays
him. It is difficult to reconcile that visit in November with the idea
that Johns should have known about the pregnancy. That Welker
could visit Johns less than two months after having given birth to their
child and have sex with him, all without telling him about their child,
is not something a reasonable person would have anticipated.

146.
147.
148.
149.
150.
151.
152.

Id. at 395, 758 S.E.2d at 380 (majority opinion).
See id., 758 S.E.2d at 380–81.
See id. at 398, 758 S.E.2d at 382 (Jackson, J., dissenting)
See id. at 398–99, 758 S.E.2d at 382.
See id. at 398, 758 S.E.2d at 382.
See id. at 395, 758 S.E.2d at 380 (majority opinion).
See supra note 83 and accompanying text.
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Besides, prior to November 2010, Johns and Welker had last seen
each other in late February or early March. Since the average
gestation period is forty weeks,153 their November rendezvous was
well within the average gestation period, counting from late February
or early March. Johns reasonably could have concluded from that
November visit that Welker had not been pregnant.
Though the dissent is concerned with the majority’s opinion
effectively imposing a standard requiring all couples to use multiple
forms of contraception,154 the majority opinion actually imposes a
standard of extreme skepticism towards current and former romantic
partners. Ruling that it was within Johns’ control to learn about his
child means that a man’s responsibility to learn about the children he
has fathered extends beyond just maintaining or establishing contact
with his former lovers. Johns would have had to be in steady contact
with Welker after their breakup, affirmatively asking her to confirm
that she was not pregnant. It is unreasonable to expect anyone to
keep in contact with any and all of his exes on the off chance that one
might have become pregnant and failed to notify him of the
pregnancy. It is even more unreasonable to expect a man to presume
that a romantic partner would come to visit and even be intimate with
him and still not tell him about a child he fathered. That level of
skepticism is unreasonable and unhealthy, undermining trust in a
relationship.
Beyond encouraging an unhealthy level of skepticism, the court
essentially gave Welker a free pass to behave badly. Arguably,
Welker perjured herself by lying on the affidavit of parentage.155
Furthermore, her misrepresentations and omissions resulted in Johns
being deprived of his fundamental constitutional right to develop a
relationship with his child. The majority admits that Welker’s
behavior was troubling,156 but she faced no consequences for that
troubling behavior and, in fact, received a verdict in her favor. There
are many contexts in which safety concerns understandably motivate
a mother not to identify her baby’s father.157 If a child’s father has a
history of domestic violence, drug and alcohol abuse, or serious
mental illness, to give a few examples, concealing his identity may
153. Pregnancy, OFF. ON WOMEN’S HEALTH, http://www.womenshealth.gov/pregnancy
/you-are-pregnant/stages-of-pregnancy.html (last updated Sep. 27, 2010) [http://perma.cc
/L8WX-HMT5].
154. See In re Adoption of S.D.W., 367 N.C. at 398, 758 S.E.2d at 382 (Jackson, J.,
dissenting).
155. See id. at 387, 758 S.E.2d at 377 (majority opinion).
156. See id. at 395, 758 S.E.2d at 380.
157. See infra notes 178–81 and accompanying text.
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very well be the best and safest course of action. But in S.D.W. there
was no evidence of such factors. In essence, the court tacitly approved
of Welker’s deception and created an incentive for others who are
similarly situated to do the same. Though Welker was in all likelihood
attempting to provide a better life for her child by placing him for
adoption, her desire should not have trumped Johns’s constitutional
interest absent a showing of unfitness or of an informed disinterest in
fathering.158
C.

Addressing the Best Interest Standard

Of course, it is understandable why the court reached the
decision it did. One of the overarching, fundamental goals of family
law is to protect the best interests of the child.159 However, it is
established law in North Carolina that the best interest of the child is
subordinate to the paramount constitutional interest of a parent as
against a nonparent, provided that the parent is fit and has not acted
inconsistently with his or her protected right.160 Generally, the “best
interest of the child” test is used in custody determinations between
two natural parents161 who are similarly situated with regard to their
constitutional right to the care, custody, and control of their
children.162 However, in custody determinations between a natural
parent and nonparents, the best interest standard can only be applied
if the natural parent is unfit or has acted inconsistently with his or her
constitutionally protected status as a parent.163 This is because there is
a legal presumption that fit parents act in their child’s best interest.164
158. See David N. v. Jason N., 359 N.C. 303, 307, 608 S.E.2d 751, 753 (2005).
159. See CHILD WELFARE INFO. GATEWAY, DETERMINING THE BEST INTERESTS OF
THE CHILD 1 (2012), https://www.childwelfare.gov/pubPDFs/best_interest.pdf [http://perma
.cc/PC62-64WS].
160. See Petersen v. Rogers, 337 N.C. 397, 403–04, 445 S.E.2d 901, 905 (1994) (holding
that “absent a finding that parents (i) are unfit or (ii) have neglected the welfare of their
children, the constitutionally-protected paramount right of parents to custody, care, and
control of their children must prevail” and explicitly rejecting plaintiffs’ argument that
“the welfare of the child is paramount to all common law preferential rights of the
parents”).
161. The term “natural parent” refers to both biological and adoptive parents. See
Price v. Howard, 346 N.C. 68, 72, 484 S.E.2d 528, 530 (1997). Prospective adoptive parents
would not likely be considered natural parents until the adoption is finalized, which divests
the child’s biological parents of all parental rights. See In re Adoption of Spinks, 32 N.C.
App 422, 424, 232 S.E.2d 479, 481 (1977).
162. See Price, 346 N.C. at 79, 484 S.E.2d at 534.
163. See Adams v. Tessener, 354 N.C. 57, 62, 550 S.E.2d 499, 503 (2001) (“Petersen and
Price, when read together, protect a natural parent’s paramount constitutional right to
custody and control of his or her children. The Due Process Clause ensures that the
government cannot unconstitutionally infringe upon a parent’s paramount right to custody
solely to obtain a better result for the child. As a result, the government may take a child
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Parents’ constitutional interest in raising their children is so
strong that they must only meet a minimum standard of care to be
considered fit parents.165 If a parent meets this minimum standard, the
best interest standard may then only be applied upon a showing by
clear and convincing evidence that the parent has acted inconsistently
with his or her constitutionally protected status.166 Acting consistently
with the constitutionally protected status is accomplished mainly
through establishing a significant “custodial, personal, or financial
relationship with [the child].”167 This support must be ongoing, so as
the child ages, these responsibilities will necessarily become more
substantial. However, when a child is very young, welcoming the child
into a home and holding him out as a biological child is considered
substantial.168
In this case, Johns never had an opportunity to welcome his son
into his home or take custody. Instead, the boy went to live with the
Joneses two days after his birth, and by the time the Supreme Court
of North Carolina ruled on this case, he was nearly four years old. It is
easy to see why the court would be hesitant to remove a four-year old
child from the only family he has ever known. Still, the constitutional

away from his or her natural parent only upon a showing that the parent is unfit to have
custody or where the parent’s conduct is inconsistent with his or her constitutionally
protected status.” (citation omitted)); Price, 346 N.C. at 79, 484 S.E.2d at 534 (“A natural
parent’s constitutionally protected paramount interest in the companionship, custody,
care, and control of his or her child is a counterpart of the parental responsibilities the
parent has assumed and is based on a presumption that he or she will act in the best
interest of the child. Therefore, the parent may no longer enjoy a paramount status if his
or her conduct is inconsistent with this presumption or if he or she fails to shoulder the
responsibilities that are attendant to rearing a child.” (citation omitted)); Petersen, 337
N.C. at 403–04, 445 S.E.2d at 905 (“[A]bsent a finding that parents (i) are unfit or (ii) have
neglected the welfare of their children, the constitutionally-protected paramount right of
natural parents to custody, care, and control of their children must prevail.”).
164. Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 68 (2000).
165. See Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 304 (1993) (“Even if it were shown, for example,
that a particular couple desirous of adopting a child would best provide for the child’s
welfare, the child would nonetheless not be removed from the custody of its parents so
long as they were providing for the child adequately. Similarly, ‘the best interests of the
child’ is not the legal standard that governs parents’ or guardians’ exercise of their
custody: So long as certain minimum requirements of child care are met, the interests of
the child may be subordinated to the interests of other children, or indeed even to the
interests of the parents or guardians themselves.” (citation omitted)).
166. See David N. v. Jason N., 359 N.C. 303, 307, 608 S.E.2d 751, 754 (2005).
167. Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248, 267 (1983).
168. In fact, if before an adoption petition is filed, a man has received a child into his
home and held him or her out to others as his biological child, his consent to adoption is
thereafter required. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 48-3-601(2)(b)(5) (2013).
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rights of parents are paramount169 and must be protected, even in
cases where the outcome is potentially heartrending. To do otherwise
risks setting a precedent that could erode the potency of those
constitutional rights in their application to future cases. Furthermore,
if the length of time spent with the prospective adoptive family
influences the decisions of courts, that creates an incentive for those
in favor of the adoption moving forward to stall litigation as long as
possible. That is, of course, assuming that the putative father has the
resources to litigate. Johns incurred considerable expenses pursuing
this case,170 but many putative fathers who find themselves in similar
situations will likely not have the resources necessary to pursue their
claims to the end and, as a result, may be unfairly cut out of their
children’s lives.
Courts should not routinely have to inquire as to the
constitutionality of adoptions that have satisfied all the statutory
requirements.171 Since it is not the place of the United States Supreme
Court to dictate how a state will handle the details of adoptions
taking place within its borders,172 the Court’s standard in Lehr
articulates only the outer limits of what is acceptable under the
Constitution.173 It’s difficult for a father to show the existence of
circumstances beyond his control.174 Many things may be within a
father’s control, but he may not realize the need to exert such control.
While it is this Recent Development’s contention that the
qualifications for notice were outside of Johns’s control, the majority
saw it differently. A better-designed statutory scheme could
contemplate and provide for these sorts of scenarios in the future,
streamlining the adoption process and ensuring increased stability for
children while also protecting the rights of putative fathers.

169. See U.S. CONST. art. VI, § 2 (“This Constitution, and the Laws of the United
States which shall be made in Pursuance thereof . . . shall be the supreme Law of the Land;
and the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or
Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding.”).
170. See supra note 13.
171. See In re Adoption of S.D.W., 367 N.C. 386, 391, 758 S.E.2d 374 378 (2014).
172. See supra note 56.
173. See supra notes 56–58 and accompanying text.
174. See supra notes 56–58 and accompanying text.
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IV. SUGGESTIONS FOR A WORKABLE STATUTORY SCHEME
A. Policy Underpinnings of the Proposed Statutory Framework
The North Carolina General Statutes are not designed to handle
adoptions where a father may not have known about his child or was
actively thwarted from developing a relationship with his child.175 The
North Carolina General Assembly needs to implement a statutory
scheme that would give meaningful protection to fathers’
constitutional rights while still safeguarding women and promoting
the best interests of children. Therefore, the general assembly should
consider adopting the Uniform Adoption Act—specifically its
provisions governing consent and termination of the parent-child
relationship.176 The Uniform Adoption Act was designed to protect
the rights of birth parents while also expediting the adoption process
and promoting family stability and the best interests of the child.177 In
other words, the Uniform Adoption Act was designed specifically to
prevent cases like S.D.W. where, under dubious circumstances, an
otherwise-fit biological father was deprived of his right to parent his
child.
In order to properly address the issue of thwarted or unwitting
fathers, one must consider what motivates a mother to hide her
pregnancy or actively thwart the father from parenting his child. For
example, in one survey, more than one-third of American women
have reported experiencing stalking, physical violence, or rape at the
hands of an intimate partner.178 In the same survey, 8.6% of women
surveyed, representing an estimated 10.3 million women, have
reported having an intimate partner who either refused to wear a
condom or attempted to impregnate them against their wishes.179
These shocking statistics demonstrate that reproductive coercion is a
reality—one that occurs all too frequently. Given that violence may
“begin or escalate during . . . pregnancy,”180 there is no doubt that
175. See supra Section I.B.
176. See UNIF. ADOPTION ACT §§ 3-502, 3-504 (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 1994).
177. Adoption Act (1994) Summary, UNIFORM L. COMMISSION, http://www.uniformlaws
.org/ActSummary.aspx?title=Adoption%20Act%20(1994) [http://perma.cc/NH59-FCWP].
178. See NAT’L CTR. FOR INJURY PREVENTION & CONTROL, CDC, NATIONAL INTIMATE
PARTNER AND SEXUAL VIOLENCE SURVEY: 2010 SUMMARY REPORT 2 (2010),
http://www.cdc.gov/ViolencePrevention/pdf/NISVS_Report2010-a.pdf [http://perma.cc/527H
-GAH4].
179. See id. at 48.
180. See Kathryn Robinson, Pregnancy and Abuse: How To Stay Safe for Your 9 Months,
NAT’L DOMESTIC VIOLENCE HOTLINE (July 23, 2013), http://www.thehotline.org/2013/07
/pregnancy-and-abuse-how-to-stay-safe-for-your-9-months/ [http://perma.cc/YHY2-D6G2].
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many women have valid, legitimate reasons for keeping their child’s
biological father in the dark. For some women, hiding a pregnancy
from a former or current partner could be the difference between life
and death.181 So how should North Carolina go about protecting men
like Johns while safeguarding women who have valid reasons for
excluding a child’s father? The Uniform Adoption Act offers
solutions to these problems and more.
B.

The Proposed Statutes’ Operation

For the most part, North Carolina’s statute listing who must
consent to an adoption tracks the Uniform Adoption Act’s analogous
provision, with only a few variances.182 The first functional difference
between the two is the timeframe during which a putative father can
assert his rights. While North Carolina’s statutes require that a man
legitimate the child or take on an obligation of support before the
filing of the petition in order to withhold consent to an adoption,183
the Uniform Adoption Act allows a putative father to intervene at
any point while the petition to adopt is pending.184 The two diverge
even further when it comes to the amount of focus each places on
thwarted or unwitting fathers. Where North Carolina’s statutes fail to
address the issue at all,185 the Uniform Adoption Act provides a stepby-step mechanism for determining whether a parent has forfeited his
constitutional interest in his child and, therefore, whether he may
withhold consent to an adoption.186
The Uniform Adoption Act requires only the consent of fathers
who have “manifest[ed] parenting behavior[,]”187 with an exception
for fathers who can demonstrate by a preponderance of the evidence
a compelling reason for not having demonstrated such behavior.188

181. Cf. N.C. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, REPORT ON DOMESTIC VIOLENCE RELATED
HOMICIDES OCCURRING IN 2013, at 4 (2013), http://www.ncdoj.gov/getdoc/43e3cd15-65fb409a-a71d-726f3dc92bf8/2013-Report-on-Domestic-Violence-Related-Homicides.aspx
[http://perma.cc/4FRS-UF6Q] (noting that in 2013, sixty-two women were murdered by an
intimate partner in North Carolina alone).
182. Compare N.C. GEN. STAT. § 48-3-601(2)(b) (2013) (stating that petitions for
adoption may only be granted by consent of any man who may not be the biological father
but was married or attempted to marry the mother when the child was born), with UNIF.
ADOPTION ACT § 3-502 (1994) (stating that petitions for adoption may be filed by a
parent whose spouse has filed a petition to adopt the child in question).
183. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 48-3-601(2)(b)(3)–(5).
184. See UNIF. ADOPTION ACT § 3-502(a).
185. See supra Section I.B.
186. See UNIF. ADOPTION ACT § 2-401 cmt.
187. See id.
188. See § 3-504(d).
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This exception is even further limited in order to weed out fathers
who are otherwise unfit. For example, the statute explicitly excludes
men who have been convicted of a violent crime or domestic violence
offense that indicates that they would be unfit parents.189 It also
excludes men whose parental rights could be terminated under state
law,190 which in North Carolina amounts to men who have abused,
abandoned, or neglected their children.191 This serves to protect
women who have justifiable reasons for excluding their child’s father.
For those who do not meet any of the statutory criteria listed
above, proving a compelling reason for not having manifested
parenting behavior is considerably easier than proving that
circumstances were beyond one’s control. Many things may be within
a person’s control but outside his or her responsibilities. However,
these same factors might still be considered compelling reasons for
not manifesting parenting behavior. Once a man has proven a
compelling reason by a preponderance of the evidence, the court
inquires as to the best interest of the child.192 If the court determines
that it is not in the best interest of the child that the father’s parental
rights be terminated, the inquiry ends there.193 His parental rights will
not be terminated, and the adoption will not go forward. But where a
man has demonstrated a compelling reason for not having stepped up
as a father and termination of parental rights is in the child’s best
interest, the inquiry continues.
Where a man has demonstrated a compelling reason for not
having taken responsibility as a parent, the adoption may still go
forward without his consent if termination of his parental rights is in
the child’s best interest and an additional listed factor is met194—
essentially creating a best interest of the child–plus standard. The
additional factors justifying termination enumerated in the statute
include an inability or unwillingness to promptly take over physical
and legal custody of the child and pay for the child’s support,195 an
inability or unwillingness to establish contact with the child and pay
for his or her support in accordance with one’s means,196 and behaving
189. See § 3-504(c)(3).
190. See § 3-504(c)(5).
191. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7B-1111(a)(1)–(10) (2013). The statute also lists having
fathered the child during the commission of a sexual offense as a ground for terminating
parental rights. See § 7B-1111(a)(11).
192. See UNIF. ADOPTION ACT § 3-504(d).
193. See id.
194. See id.
195. § 3-504(d)(1).
196. § 3-504(d)(2).
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or having behaved in a way that demonstrates unfitness to parent or
risks substantial harm to the child’s well-being.197 The additional
factor requirement can also be met by showing that failing to
terminate the parental relationship would result in detriment to the
child.198 Determining what constitutes detriment to the child is guided
by a catchall provision in the statute.199 This catchall provision gives
judges discretion to consider the efforts the thwarted father made to
establish a relationship with his child, the role the birth mother played
in thwarting the father, and a number of other factors that may
influence the child’s well-being.200 The compelling reason, best
interest, and best interest of the child–plus standards utilized in the
Uniform Adoption Act manage to balance at times competing
interests: a biological father’s constitutionally protected interest in
developing a relationship with his children and the best interest of the
child.
Adopting the provisions of consent and termination from the
Uniform Adoption Act would also make it clear to the public what
the controlling legal standard is. A well-defined standard is easier for
courts to enforce through their decisions than is an intentionally
vague constitutional standard. With detailed statutes in place and a
clear framework to follow, courts would be more likely to produce
results that did not stray into potentially unconstitutional territory.
Courts would be tasked only with interpreting the statute and spared
the additional constitutional analysis and the heightened potential for
appeals that come with it. Furthermore, the answers in difficult cases
like S.D.W. would be more easily ascertainable, thereby reducing the
possibility of protracted litigation and, consequently, increasing
stability for the children involved.
Were North Carolina to adopt the Uniform Adoption Act’s
provisions, the end result would be clearer decisions and fewer
reversals. Expectations would be clear, children would be spared the
pain of forming attachments to an adoptive family only to be sent

197. § 3-504(d)(3).
198. § 3-504(d)(4).
199. § 3-504(e).
200. See id. (“In making a determination under subsection (d)(4), the court shall
consider any relevant factor, including the respondent’s efforts to obtain or maintain legal
and physical custody of the minor, the role of other persons in thwarting the respondent’s
efforts to assert parental rights, the respondent’s ability to care for the minor, the age of
the minor, the quality of any previous relationship between the respondent and the minor
and between the respondent and any other minor children, the duration and suitability of
the minor’s present custodial environment, and the effect of a change of physical custody
on the minor.”).
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back to a birth family, and adoptive parents’ pain would be mitigated
as well. Furthermore, had the Uniform Adoption Act’s standards
been adopted in North Carolina, S.D.W. almost certainly would have
been decided differently.
C.

Application of the Uniform Adoption Act to S.D.W.

Applying the Uniform Adoption Act’s provisions to the facts in
S.D.W. provides a definitive answer to a close case. Had the Uniform
Adoption Act’s termination of parental rights provisions been in
place, instead of being tasked with proving that qualifications for
notice were beyond his control, Johns only would have had to
demonstrate a compelling reason for why he had not participated in
his child’s life. Proving a compelling reason by a preponderance of the
evidence is much easier than proving that the situation was beyond
his control. Reasonable minds can—and did—disagree as to whether
it was outside of Johns’s control to obtain knowledge of his child. But
the court would be harder pressed to justify a ruling that Johns did
not have a compelling reason for not becoming involved in his child’s
life in light of Welker’s deception and misrepresentations.
Once Johns had proven a compelling reason, the inquiry would
then move to the child’s best interest. The court would be tasked with
determining whether it would be in the best interest of the child for
Johns’s parental rights to be terminated. Two days after the child was
born, he was placed with the Joneses.201 A court very likely would
choose the Joneses, two parents who wanted and planned for a child
and went through a considerable amount of trouble to adopt, over
Johns, a single parent who never intended to become a father. But
even if it were in the child’s best interest to remain with the Joneses,
Johns would still have had the right to withhold his consent to the
adoption. Johns was prepared to promptly take over the child’s
physical and legal custody and pay for his support, and there was no
evidence that he was unfit, so he does not meet any of the additional
statutory factors required for the termination of parental rights under
the Uniform Adoption Act. His consent still would have been
required.202
In the end, had the Uniform Adoption Act been enacted in
North Carolina, Johns likely would have won his case. He would have
been entitled to stop the Joneses’ adoption and take on an active

201. See In re Adoption of S.D.W., 367 N.C. 386, 388, 758 S.E.2d 374, 376 (2014).
202. See Part III’s discussion of the lack of evidence indicating that Jones posed any
danger to either Welker or her child, supra; see also UNIF. ADOPTION ACT § 3-504(d).
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parenting role instead. Though it is understandable that a judge might
hesitate to remove a young child from the only home and family she
has ever known, the alternative is to deny Johns his constitutional
rights. Denying Johns the opportunity to exercise his constitutional
rights potentially weakens the well-established legal principle that a
parent has a constitutional right to the care, custody, and control of
his children.203 Moreover, had the Uniform Adoption Act been in
place, an appropriate legal judgment would have been more easily
ascertainable. Litigation likely would not have lasted for more than
three years as it did in S.D.W., since, under the Uniform Adoption
Act, the court’s only task would have been to apply the clear and
precise statute without having to wade into murky and vague
constitutional territory. While it is a natural human instinct and an
otherwise worthy goal to protect and promote children’s best
interests, it is still the responsibility of the courts to uphold the
Constitution, even when it produces unpalatable results. A better and
more thorough statutory provision governing consent to adoption and
termination of rights, such as the Uniform Adoption Act, would have
balanced the competing interests articulated in Lehr while simplifying
the analysis for the court and easing its burden.
CONCLUSION
It is a well-established principle that parents have a
constitutional interest in the care, custody, and control of their
children.204 However, “the mere existence of a biological link”205 does
not necessarily merit constitutional protection when a father has
failed to step up and take on the responsibilities that come with
parenting.206 While it is clear that an absent or uninterested father
should not be able to withhold his consent to an adoption, when the
putative father was previously unaware of the child it is difficult to
nail down the precise point where he has forfeited his constitutional
right to develop a relationship with his child and when an adoption
can proceed without his consent.
When a child is placed for adoption, the state is forced to balance
several competing interests—those of the birth parents, those of the
adoptive parents, and those of the child. In S.D.W., the court allowed
an adoption to become final without the consent of the child’s

203.
204.
205.
206.

See Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 66 (2000).
See Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 651 (1972).
Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248, 261 (1983).
See id.
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biological father because learning of his child’s existence was deemed
to be within his control.207 This Recent Development analyzed why
the majority was wrong and how the father’s knowledge of his son
and his entitlement to withhold consent were beyond his control.208
Moreover, Johns’s case has the potential for broad implications in
future adoptions, with the majority opinion effectively requiring an
unreasonably high level of skepticism between men and their
romantic partners in order to safeguard his constitutional rights.
Difficult cases like S.D.W. could be made easier for the courts if the
North Carolina General Assembly were to enact further adoption
legislation addressing the issue of fathers who are unaware of their
children or have been otherwise thwarted from developing a
relationship with them. As they stand now, North Carolina’s adoption
laws are woefully inadequate, failing to provide meaningful guidance.
By contrast, the Uniform Adoption Act contemplates thwarted
and unwitting fathers and provides a mechanism for balancing their
rights against the best interest of the child, while also taking into
account the real and legitimate reasons a woman might have for
hiding a pregnancy or preventing a father from developing a
relationship with his child. North Carolina would do well to adopt
these provisions. Had they been in place, the outcome in S.D.W.
would have been different. As marriage becomes less prevalent and
unconventional family arrangements more the norm, courts will be
forced to confront more cases like S.D.W. The North Carolina
General Assembly should take action and enact statutes, like the
Uniform Adoption Act, that will protect the constitutional rights of
fathers within the state while still promoting the child’s interests.
Until such time, it is the responsibility of the courts to uphold the
Constitution, even when it produces unpopular results.
ERIN E. GIBBS**

207. See In re Adoption of S.D.W., 367 N.C. 386, 396, 758 S.E.2d 374, 381 (2014).
208. See supra Part III.
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